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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
SHEILA J. SHIPLER, : Case No. 930164-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Sheila J. Shipler relies on her opening 
brief and and also refers to that brief for the statements of the 
issues, jurisdiction, the case, and the facts. Appellant replies to 
the State's brief as follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On November 19, 1990, the trial court sentenced Ms. Shipler 
"to a term in the Utah State Prison . . . not to exceed five years; 
(Suspended)." (R 30). The court granted Ms. Shipler "a stay of the 
above (prison) sentence and placed [her] on probation. . ." 
(R 30). Ms. Shipler then successfully completed probation. (R 35). 
The reduction statute squarely addresses her situation. 
"Whenever a conviction is for a felony, the conviction 
shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor if . . . the imposition of the 
sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on probation, . . • 
and [s]he is thereafter discharged without violating [her] 
probation." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b). Ms. Shipler fully 
complied with the plain language of the statute; her felony 
conviction should have been reduced to a misdemeanor. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE'S UNPRESERVED ARGUMENT SUGGESTS A REQUIREMENT 
WHICH CANNOT BE ATTAINED AND ONE CONTRARY TO THE PLAIN 
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
For the first time on appeal, the State in its brief argued 
that Ms. Shipler "ha[d] no vested right" to a reduction of her 
felony conviction. Appellee's brief, Point I. During the lower 
proceedings, however, the prosecution did not argue that Ms. Shipler 
lacked a "vested right" in the reduction statute at any and all 
times; it merely contended that Ms. Shipler "can't come in and use 
Section 402 [the reduction statute] for a second time." (R 85). 
Contrary to the State's claim, see Appellee's brief, page 13, its 
unpreserved argument should not be considered.1 Cf. State v. 
Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1138-39 (Utah 1989); State v. Brown, 212 
Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 40 (Utah App. 1993) (the "specificity requirement 
arises out of the trial court's need to assess allegations by 
isolating relevant facts and considering them in the context of the 
specific legal doctrine placed at issue"). 
1. As noted recently by this Court, the "line" separating 
preserved and unpreserved arguments is very fine and unforgiving. 
See State v. Cecala, Case No. 920592-CA (Utah App. filed October 18, 
1993) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) ("defendant only asserted 
at trial that the false name evidence was unfairly prejudicial . . . 
and did not assert that the evidence was not relevant . . . [; he] 
is therefore barred from raising this argument for the first time on 
appeal"); State v. Brown, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 40 (Utah App. 1993) 
("a general objection may be insufficient to preserve a specific 
substantive issue for appeal"). 
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Aside from the preservation problems, the State7s argument 
on appeal implicates serious procedural deficiencies and notice 
violations. According to its brief, "[b]ecause defendant's 
probationary term was not successfully completed prior to the 
effective date of the 1991 amendments, defendant's expectation of 
relief never matured into a vested right in the reduction 
proceedings provided for under the 1990 version of section 
76-3-402(2)(b)." Appellee's brief, page 13. 
The State's argument, however, ignores the extended nature 
of probation and suggests a "prerequisite" which would have been 
impossible to comply with. Ms. Shipler began her 36 month period of 
probation on or about November 19, 1990. (R 30). The 1990 
reduction statute was in effect. Barely six months had passed 
before April 29, 1991, the effective date of the 1991 reduction 
statute amendments. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 1991). 
Ms. Shipler could not be expected to complete 36 months of probation 
in a 6 month period of time. Accord Appellee's brief, page 7 
(emphasis added) (where the State acknowledged that "defendant was 
not able to fulfill these preconditions prior to the effective date 
of the 1991 amendments . . . " ) . The reduction statute would be 
rendered meaningless (especially if probation lasted 36 months) 
because subsequent statutory amendments within that same period of 
time (e.g. 36 months) makes it impossible for a probationer to 
successfully complete the initially imposed term. 
As it turned out, Ms. Shipler's strict adherence to the 
terms of her probation prompted Adult Probation & Parole ("AP&P") to 
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recommend an early termination of her probation. See (R 35) (on 
August 21, 1991, a mere 10 months after Sheila Shipler began her 
probation, the trial court followed AP&P's recommendation: 
"Probation be terminated as successful"). Sheila's "expectation of 
relief . . . into a vested right" cannot be affected by time 
limitations beyond her control. The 1990 statute applies. See 
Harris v. Smith, 541 P.2d 343 (Utah 1975) (emphasis in original and 
citations omitted) ("the law in force at the time of sentencing 
governed and . . . an amendment to the statute passed after sentence 
had been imposed had no effect on the matter"); Opening brief of 
Ms. Shipler, page 10 n.2; Appellee's brief, page 11 n.6 
Furthermore, at the time of the November 19, 1990, 
sentencing proceeding, Ms. Shipler recognized that her circumstances 
would fall under the plain language of the 1990 statute. AP&P's 
presentence report placed Sheila in the "Excellent" category with a 
recommendation of no incarceration. (R 74). She had no prior 
criminal record. (R 75). Even if Sheila had not then moved to 
reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor, the reduction could 
have occurred following her successful completion of probation. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (1990) (emphasis added) ("Whenever a 
conviction is for a felony, the conviction shall be deemed to be a 
misdemeanor if . . . the defendant is placed on probation, . . . and 
he is thereafter discharged without violating his probation"); cf. 
(R 89-90) (Ms. Shipler's counsel noted that the court could have 
taken the reduction motion under advisement for the period of 
probation). 
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Despite the State's claims, two reductions are permitted 
under the 1990 statute. As Ms. Shipler's counsel had explained, 
"there [are] a number of ways that the Court can proceed on that 
[her reduction motion]. The Court can do that right now. The Court 
could allow her to complete probation and entertain our motion to 
reduce this to a misdemeanor status after probation." (R 75). Two 
reductions are now disallowed, but the 1990 version required it 
where, as here, the probationer successfully completed probation. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (1990); State v. Baqshawf 836 
P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah App. 1992) ("Section 76-3-402(2) indicates 
that, when probation is successfully completed, a felony conviction 
'shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor[.]"). 
Receiving an initial reduction at the time of sentencing 
does not alter the mandatory language of the 1990 statute. Upon 
successful completion of probation and with no other relevant 
requirement, subsection (2)(b) enabled Ms. Shipler to have her 
felony conviction subsequently "deemed to be a misdemeanor." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (1990). 
Ms. Shipler should not be penalized for recognizing that an 
initial reduction at the time of sentencing lessened the period of 
possible confinement from 1-15 years (for a second degree felony) to 
0-5 years (for a third degree felony). A subsequent reduction 
following probation not only entitled her to the misdemeanor 
classification, such steps protected Sheila from an avoidable 
contingency. If Ms. Shipler had simply accepted the stayed 
imposition of the 1-15 year term without also moving for a 
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reduction, she risked a greater period of confinement (i.e. up to an 
additional 10 years) in the event of a probation violation. Counsel 
for Ms. Shipler prudently represented Sheila and ensured that the 
imposed sentence would not subject her to an unnecessary consequence. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT STAYED IMPOSITION OF MS. SHIPLEIES 
SENTENCE 
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief) 
According to the State, "[a] trial court can withhold 
sentence either by staying its imposition or by staying execution of 
a sentence already imposed." Appellee's brief, page 17. The former 
situation the State argues, applies to the instant case. See 
Appellee's brief, page 16. However, even though "probation can also 
be a sentence," the State argues that "the term 'sentence' as used 
[in the reduction statute] is construed to mean the 'sentence' 
specified for a third degree felony, i.e., a term of years." 
Appellee's brief, page 17 n.13. Utah's statutes do not allow for 
such a construction. 
Contrary to the State's claims, if a lower court withheld 
sentence "by staying its imposition", there would be no final 
judgment of the court. Consequently, the involved person could not 
appeal the underlying proceedings. See Opening brief of 
Ms. Shipler, page 6; State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978) 
("[i]t is the sentence itself which constitutes a final judgment 
from which appellant has the right to appeal"); cf. State v. Casef 
Case No. 930420-CA (Utah App. filed September 7, 1993) (per curiam) 
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(unpublished decision) (an order which "fails to impose sentence and 
provides simply that '[s]entencing has been stayed pending appeal'" 
is an unappealable order) (attached in the Addendum). 
More absurdly, if a trial court placed a person on 
probation and revoked it (within 36 months), under the State's 
selective construction of the term "probation" there would be yet 
another "sentence" which the probationer could not appeal. Neither 
the initial proceeding (e.g. guilty plea to the felony charge) nor 
the subsequent court ruling revoking probation would be appealable 
because the trial court would have withheld "sentence" from the 
outset. 
Viewed another way, assume that a court does not "set" a 
term of incarceration and instead places the defendant on 
probation. If no prison term was "set" and assuming probation was 
successfully completed, the court would have failed to impose 
"sentence" for the underlying conviction. The State's claims2 must 
fail. The court order imposing a period of probation must remain an 
appealable sentencing order. 
2. In its brief, the State contends "imposition of 
sentence is stayed" as long as a term of incarceration is not 
stated. See Appellee's brief, page 17; (R 52). But cf. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (a probationer may be required to "serve a period 
of time in the county jail not to exceed one year"). At the same 
time, however, imposition of sentence is not stayed when a prison 
sentence is recorded on the "Judgment, Sentence & Commitment" form. 
Appellee's brief, pages 16-17. Such a position would allow a 
nonexistent prison term to constitute a stayed imposition of 
sentence, while a prison term—which was already imposed by the 
trial court—may not later be stayed. 
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A common sense reading of the reduction statute governs 
this appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b). The meaning of a 
"stayed imposition of sentence" cannot be limited to only 
withholding prison sentences pending the successful completion of 
probation. Appellee's brief, Point II. By statute, a "sentence" 
includes more than an indeterminate term of years or "imprisonment." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1)(d). Sentences also include 
probationary terms and fines, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201(1)(a) & 
-201(1)(c), both of which may be used for reductions. See Opening 
Brief of Ms. Shipler, pages 8-10 (if the State's argument was 
followed, "[t]he reduction statute could never be triggered if, for 
example, a court "set" a sentence of a $100 fine, and immediately 
stayed payment in favor of (the successful completion of) 
probation"). 
,f[T]he State's analysis proceeds under the [1991] amended 
version of the statute[,]" Appellee's brief, page 16 n.ll, but, as 
already discussed, the 1990 statute applies. Moreover, the amended 
version contains provisions which did not exist under the 1990 
statute and are inapposite to the case at bar. What is now 
disallowed under the current provisions were then authorized under 
the 1990 reduction statute. That much is clear, at least by 
negative implication, or there would have been no need to add the 
amendments• 
The proceedings are one in which the trial court had 
initially noted, "What harm is done [by granting the reduction]?" 
(R 86). The court queried the prosecutor about making "motions in 
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the interest of justice on occasion[,]" (R 87-88), and a reduction 
here will have little impact beyond eliminating a felony from an 
otherwise "clean" record. The statutory amendments since passed now 
fully address the State's concerns and few people match 
Ms. Shipler's circumstances. 
The trial court improperly interpreted the mandate of the 
reduction statute. Its order denying Ms. Shipler's motion should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Shipler respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
trial court's order of denial and reduce her conviction to a class B 
misdemeanor. 
SUBMITTED this f( day of November, 1993. 
1&" £>jri 
RONALD S. "fttf: tflNO Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused eight 
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this day of November, 
1993. 
ONMLD S.^FUJ] 
DELIVERED by 
this day of November, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM 
riLED 
Jtsn Ccurt cr Acoeais 
IN TH2 OTAH C3CRT OF APPEALS 
—~ocCco~~ 
State of CJtah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
James 3. Case, 
Defendant and Appellant:. 
G?Z 
/ • «aiy 7. Nccnan 
MEMORANDUM 0E£rsrc5Pcrt::aCcurt 
(Not For Publ icat ion) 
Case No. 930420-CA 
F I L E D 
(September 7, 1993} 
Third C i r c u i t , S a l t LaJce Department 
The Honorable Robin W. Reese 
Attorneys: Deborah XreecJc Mendez, Salt LaJce City, for Aooeliant 
Stephen P. Zollinger, Salt LaJce City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Russon, aiilings, and Greenwood (Law & Motion) . 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on its own notice of 
consideration for summary disposition, to which only appellee has 
responded. We dismiss the appeal. 
Defendant seeJcs to appeal his conviction for driving under 
the influence, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41*6-44 (Supp. 
1993), a class 3 misdemeanor. On April 23, 1993, the trial" court 
signed a document entitled "Final Order Judgment and Conviction,,f 
which "orders" that defendant: was found guilty of the stated 
offense following a conditional guilty plea. Significantly, the 
order fails to impose sentence and provides simply that 
"£s]entencing has been stayed pending appeal." 
Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, precludes 
parties from appealing non-final"judgments. A final judgment is 
one that ends the proceedings between the parties, "leaving no 
question open for further judicial action." State in rnterest of 
T.p.e. . 743 P.2d 201, 202 (Utah. App. 1988). A judgment in a 
criminal matter that fails to impose sentence does not: resolve 
the proceedings between the parties, and "[ijt is the sentence 
itself which constitutes a final judgment from which appellant 
has the right to appeal." State v. Ggrr^rt. 584 P.2d 385, 386 
(Utah 1973) . Therefore, the judgment sougftt to be appealed is 
not a final order for the purposes of appeal. 
The appeal is dismissed, without prejudice to the timely 
filing of a notice of appeal after entry of a final, apoealable 
order*1 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
197-
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. Defendant suggests that we remand "with appropriate 
instruction regarding the stay of sentencing pending appeal.n 
Since we are without appellate jurisdiction over this case, it 
would be inappropriate for us to give any instruction to the 
trial court regarding sentencing* 
